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COMMENTARY
COMMAND AND CONTROL DURING THE “PERFECT STORM” HURRICANE 
IRMA AND THE ENSUING NATURAL DISASTERS DURING SEPTEMBER 2017 
WITHIN REGION 9, MARINE CORPS EMBASSY SECURITY GROUP
Joseph E. Galvin
In September 2017, the Caribbean basin and the state of Florida encountered 
Hurricane Irma—the most powerful and potentially the most devastating storm 
to impact the region since recordings began� This category 5 hurricane formed 
in the southern part of the North Atlantic Ocean and traversed to the Leeward 
Islands, smashing into Antigua, Barbuda, Saint Martin, and the U�S� Virgin Is-
lands, leaving them in a major state of peril� All the while, the forecasted path of 
the eye of the storm directly targeted the metropolitan centers of Miami and Fort 
Lauderdale, the latter the home of Region 9 Headquarters (HQ), Marine Corps 
Embassy Security Group (MCESG)� The hurricane continued on its path, grazing 
Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti, fortunately sparing their people 
major desolation and their infrastructure major damage, but still wreaking havoc 
on those nations� The hurricane then slammed into the northern beaches of 
Cuba, where the U�S� embassy is situated� As Irma bounced off Cuba, the eye of 
the hurricane changed its projected track, shifting to bring the brunt of the storm 
to the Florida Keys and the western side of main-
land Florida� This extraordinary turn of events 
dramatically altered destruction forecasts and 
impacted command-and-control (C2) operations�
As if a category 5 hurricane rampaging among 
Region 9’s detachments and barreling directly to-
ward Region 9 HQ were not enough to disrupt C2, 
the storm threatened to produce ten- to fifteen- 
foot storm surges along multiple coasts, and actually 
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COMMENTARY
spawned numerous confirmed tornadoes throughout mainland Florida� Adding 
to the mix, during the height of hurricane command operations, Mexico expe-
rienced an earthquake measuring 8�1 on the Richter scale—breaking a century- 
old record—that triggered emergency reactions from Detachment Mexico City�1 
This earthquake brought threats of tsunamis off the coasts of Mexico, El Salva-
dor, and Guatemala, causing detachments there to consider emergency actions� 
Furthermore, during the aftermath, Detachment Havana experienced major 
flooding of the chancery that affected operational abilities and administrative 
routines� A pseudothreat of fire even challenged Region 9 HQ’s displaced opera-
tions center—a fire alarm forced evacuation for a period�
This lays out the situation that Region 9, MCESG—the command element for 
all the Marine security guards (MSGs) for embassies in the Caribbean, Central 
America, and Canada—was charged with controlling� As the regional headquar-
ters for the Caribbean MSG detachments in the embassies in Cuba, Haiti, the 
Dominican Republic, Barbados, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, Region 9 HQ ensures 
that assigned Marines are trained to coordinate with and follow the operational 
and emergency-action plans laid out by the regional security officer (RSO) for 
hurricanes and their aftermath� Additionally, the Region 9 HQ staff maintains 
direct administrative control over these detachments to ensure completion of all 
training and manpower matters�
C2 within the Region 9 HQ staff and with the MSG detachments during Hur-
ricane Irma focused on safety, communication, and accountability�
Safety
Safety was the theme—the main focus of effort—during Hurricane Irma� The 
number one command priority in a natural disaster, especially one as potentially 
devastating and unpredictable as a category 5 hurricane, is the safety of Marines 
and their families� No loss of material possessions, missed work time, or personal 
inconvenience can trump a well-contemplated decision that offers safety from 
death or serious injury� Decisions involving safety are made continuously and 
courses of action may be adapted or otherwise change, depending on the path 
of the hurricane and the trail of destruction it leaves� Safety is the priority not 
only during preparations and the actual weathering of the hurricane but also, 
and perhaps most importantly, during the cleanup phase, as this is when people 
are most likely to let their guard down, leading to accidents� A combination of 
full-blown and speedier operational risk management (ORM) plans provides 
outstanding assessments of courses of action contemplated during hurricane 
phases� Understanding the potential safety issues that hurricanes bring and how 
they can affect the well-being of Marines is crucial to exercising command with 
safety as a priority�
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During preparation, Region 9 HQ coordinated with the potentially affected 
detachments and the respective RSOs to determine whether additional support 
from the Marine Security Augmentation Unit (MSAU) at MCESG would be re-
quired� In two cases, those of the Dominican Republic and Haiti, such support 
was requested and provided� MSAU Marines arrived in those countries to assist 
with any safety and operational matters the RSOs deemed necessary� This sup-
port provided extra MSGs to protect the embassies’ compounds, add manpower 
to the detachments, and respond to operational incidents, thereby providing an 
extra layer of safety and security to the embassies� Region 9 HQ continuously 
preached safety to the detachments during the successive hurricane phases� Un-
derstanding the ORM for each plan of action and communicating that concept 
to every Marine were crucial to success in the campaign against Hurricane Irma�
Region 9 HQ employed another calculated safety measure by issuing a depar-
ture order for the HQ staff to evacuate southern Florida and put the continuity 
of operations plan (COOP) into effect� The prescribed evacuation safe haven was 
MacDill Air Force Base (AFB) in Tampa, Florida� This decision was not taken 
lightly, as the main thrust of the region strategic C2 takes place in HQ, where the 
infrastructure is in place� However, considering all the factors—Florida’s gover-
nor directing mandatory departure from parts of the county in which Region 9 
HQ is located and some Region 9 HQ Marines live, the Florida Regional Center 
(the physical location of Region 9 HQ) officially closing, and a category 5 hur-
ricane bearing down directly on the location—the order was sensible, logical, 
timely, and prudent�2 Bottom line: it was the right thing to do�
Marines are taught to adapt and overcome to accomplish the mission� The 
execution of the COOP at MacDill was a true testament to that ethos� However, 
Region 9 HQ would be tested again� After Region 9 HQ spent thirty-six hours 
conducting operations from the safe haven, the unpredictable hurricane curved 
westward around southern Florida, now severely threatening the Tampa coast-
line� At this juncture, the commanding general of MacDill AFB ordered the 
evacuation of all residents and guests� By all analyses, this was an astute decision, 
as Hurricane Irma’s new course endangered thousands� Reacting to this new 
chain of events, Region 9 HQ developed courses of action in a hasty planning 
process, then settled on a dispersion of forces to various safe locations through-
out South Carolina, Georgia, and northern Florida�3 The resultant split-forces 
operations required detailed coordination and a particularized communications 
plan (discussed later)�
This theme of safety applied not only to the Marines of Region 9 but also to 
their families� Where authorized departures were activated at the embassies, Re-
gion 9 HQ encouraged detachment commanders to send families out of harm’s 
way and helped coordinate logistical and administrative efforts to ensure a 
Winter2018Review.indb   142 11/1/17   9:56 AM
3
Galvin: Commentary
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
 G A LV I N  1 4 3
smooth process� Similarly, when Region 9 HQ decided to put the departure order 
into effect, safety of the families was a critical factor� All courses of action hinged 
on the safety of the activity or preparation, whether that involved ensuring that 
Marines had approved safe relocation sites; planned travel itineraries (via flying 
or driving); or adequate food, water, other emergency provisions, and rest� Get-
ting the Region 9 family as a whole into the safest position possible to weather 
the hurricane allowed the Marines to continue to carry out their duties effectively, 
even when facing the dilemmas resulting from operating amid multiple natural 
disasters�
Communication
Safe operational courses of action are successful only when a sustainable and 
reliable communication structure allows a free flow of information� One of the 
tenets of the Region 9 commanding officer’s (CO’s) command philosophy is that 
effective communication entails ensuring that information is conveyed to all who 
need to know it in a timely manner� During Hurricane Irma, operations involved 
keeping a communication gateway among the affected detachments, Region 9 
HQ, and other MCESG HQs� A preestablished communication plan enabled con-
stant information flow throughout each event during this period of the “perfect 
storm�” For example, when the earthquake off the coast of Mexico threatened to 
produce devastating tsunamis and aftershocks that would impact Guatemala, 
Mexico, and El Salvador, the Region 9 CO, MCESG, and the detachments com-
municated up-to-the-minute status reports on Marines’ welfare, embassy dam-
age, and local weather�
These entities used a highly effective push-and-pull system of information 
gathering/producing that was effectuated by multiple media, including e-mail; 
web-based applications; and cell phone text and voice functions, as well as ap-
plications (specifically, WhatsApp)� An open, flat communication structure 
within which all parties were privy to real-time information dispensed with any 
communication lag, enabling those who required critical information to make 
efficient and knowledgeable decisions� For example, Region 9 HQ was able to 
produce multiple daily situation reports for MCESG HQ that offered insight on 
the overall status of the command and where the focus of attention needed to be 
as Hurricane Irma navigated through the region’s area of responsibility� Often 
these reports were completed via e-mail; however, when communication media 
did not work because of weather, other forms were employed as well�
In contingency operations communication is never perfect; this was true dur-
ing the Hurricane Irma event� Use of cell phones and the Internet during and 
after the hurricane proved to be troublesome, not only because of connectivity 
issues but also because almost the entire state of Florida and the Caribbean lost 
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electrical service for various periods� Conserving resources was key to allowing 
communications to continue to flow in an effective manner�
Instituting a multimedia communication structure provided significant insur-
ance against a total communication breakdown across the vast region� However, 
Region 9 HQ prepared for any anomaly by designating a special Hurricane Irma 
liaison officer who would assume the position of the Region 9 HQ and act as 
an intermediary between the detachments and MCESG HQ� The Region 9 CO 
appointed the Ottawa (Canada) detachment commander to this liaison position 
and established a protocol that provided set timelines, so if all communication 
from Region 9 HQ was lost the liaison officer automatically would follow a pre-
scribed plan� This “fallback” provision proved extremely beneficial� The liaison 
officer relayed information to detachments and MCESG, but more importantly 
provided stability within the region while the HQ element went through multiple 
evacuations and natural catastrophes� For example, when the tornadoes ripped 
through central Florida and temporarily cut off cell phone and Internet service, 
the liaison officer was able to keep up a continuous stream of communication 
with the detachments, providing assessments of embassy damage�
Accountability
Perhaps the most critical use of effective communication was to account for 
personnel and equipment� During Hurricane Irma, judicious and steadfast 
communicative processes enabled all detachments and HQ Marines to submit 
morning reports with 100 percent accountability, providing higher HQs with 
an assurance that all personnel were accounted for, uninjured, and safe� Region 
9 HQ mandated that all personnel report in each morning; prior to, during, and 
on completion of any prolonged movement; and when any commander-critical 
information requirements specific to the hurricane were triggered (e�g�, injury 
or power outage)� Prior to the hurricane’s arrival, all the detachments reported 
accountability via the Internet� However, as the storm traversed the region and 
destroyed electrical power grids and paralyzed Internet access, detachments 
switched to other methods, including cell phones� For example, Cuba lost power 
for more than a week owing to wind damage and the flooding of the embassy, but 
the detachment used cell phones effectively to provide morning and situational 
reports to Region 9 HQ� Similarly, when Region 9 HQ was forced to conduct 
operations from separate physical locations after the second evacuation, it con-
ducted internal accountability through the WhatsApp cell phone application, 
providing a flat-line communication method that allowed instantaneous distri-
bution of information to all�
Ensuring the whereabouts, condition, and safety of Marines and unit equip-
ment is the core of C2� Accountability comes as second nature to Marine 
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commanders—but it may not be truly tested until lives are at risk� MSG com-
mand naturally embodies a strong accountability requirement, given that regions’ 
detachments are dispersed throughout broad areas of the world; however, risk to 
life and limb is not always present�4 Accountability becomes even more vital when 
the lives of family members and friends accompanying Marines are entrusted to 
the Marine Corps family� Hurricane Irma and its accompanying natural disasters 
tested Region 9’s accountability procedures� Throughout the storms, Region 9 
accounted for all its detachment Marines and families; this included the Region 
9 HQ staff, family, and accompanying friends through two evacuations and hun-
dreds of miles of travel�
Accountability cannot be taken for granted or assumed at any time, but espe-
cially during times of peril� Accurate accountability allows for the timely mitiga-
tion of issues and quicker resolution of problems that might fester without due 
attention� As noted, during the hurricane, Region 9 conducted accountability 
procedures in response to multiple triggers� This enabled the command and 
higher HQ to have full faith and confidence that all Marines and family mem-
bers were uninjured and in safe locations� Because of the distances traveled and 
shortages of fuel, accountability was fundamental when Region 9 HQ Marines 
dispersed from Tampa to their various safe havens�
Command and control within the Region 9 HQ staff and the MSG detach-
ments during Hurricane Irma and the other natural disasters focused on safety, 
communication, and accountability� The interplay among these three elements 
highlighted the importance of establishing mechanisms to facilitate internal and 
external coordination� Ensuring the well-being of Marines and families when life 
and limb are at risk is paramount to leadership, and it was the priority in this case� 
Constant, effective communication that provided up-to-date information to and 
from all affected units and individuals established positive control and instilled 
confidence in command capabilities� Employing multiple media mechanisms 
safeguarded against potential communication breakdowns that would have 
crippled administrative and operational movements� Accountability of Marines 
and equipment was a core concept of control and ensured timely and accurate 
reporting� The unpredictable and challenging scenarios encountered during the 
“perfect storm” truly tested the tenets of command and control�
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1� Joshua Berlinger, Mariano Castillo, and Ray 
Sanchez, “Mexico’s Strongest Earthquake in a 
Century Leaves Dozens Dead,” CNN, Septem-
ber 9, 2017, www�cnn�com/�
2� Governor Rick Scott issued partial mandatory 
evacuations for sixteen counties and directed 
voluntary evacuations for thirteen other 
counties� Sarah Almukhtar et al�, “Maps: 
Tracking Hurricane Irma’s Path over Florida,” 
New York Times, September 11, 2017, www 
�nytimes�com/�
3� Maintaining a regional HQ in one location 
and still accomplishing the mission was 
deemed impossible because no lodging was 
available within approximately five hun-
dred miles of Tampa� The course of action 
employed was for Region 9 HQ staff to stay 
with friends and family within the (relatively) 
immediate area of northern Florida, Georgia, 
and South Carolina�
4� For some detachments, the threat of death or 
serious bodily injury is a daily peril (e�g�, in 
Afghanistan)� The hazards associated with a 
hurricane or other natural disasters do not 
compare to man-made threats; the point is 
that the dangers vary�
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